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ARGUMENT 
L THE PARTIES' INTENT TO ENTER A FORMAL WRITTEN 
AGREEMENT DID NOT RESERVE DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO 
RESCIND. 
Defendants' and Plaintiff 1-800 Contacts, Inc.'s ("Plaintiff or "1800Contacts") 
intent to enter into a formal written agreement did not reserve Defendants' right to 
rescind the agreement prior to the execution of the written agreement. Such a conclusion 
is contrary to the express language of Defendant Randolph Weigner's ("Mr. Weigner") 
escape clause and the express language of the April 15, 2004 e-mail correspondence 
between Mr. Weigner and Jonathan Coon ("Coon"), CEO of 1800Contacts. [Record 
("R.") at 8-10 At the very least, there are genuine issues of material fact concerning 
whether Defendants' escape clause was intended to apply only to Mr. Weigner's offer (as 
set forth in his April 13, 2004 e-mail) or whether, despite being unstated, it also applied 
to Mr. Weigner's April 15, 2004 acceptance of 1800Contact's counter-offer. [Id.]. 
The law is clear that an enforceable binding agreement can be entered into despite 
the parties' expressed intent to enter a formal written agreement at a later time. See, e.g., 
Calumet Refining Co. v. Star Lubricating Co., 230 P. 1028, 1029-30 (Utah 1924) 
(holding that two telegrams constituted a binding contract, even though the acceptance 
contained language indicating that a written contact would yet be prepared and 
delivered); Rand-Whitney Packaging Corp. v. Robertson Group, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 520, 
530 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding that letter setting forth the basic terms of an asset purchase 
agreement was intended by both parties to be a binding agreement, which contained the 
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essential terms necessary for specific performance, despite intent to enter a formal written 
agreement at a later time); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts 2d § 27. The 
intent of the parties to enter into a formal agreement at a later date simply does not 
excuse a party's breach of the original agreement. See, e.g., Calumet Refining, 230 P. at 
1029-30; Rand-Whitney Packaging, 651 F. Supp. at 530. 
Mr. Weigner expressly stated that the escape clause set forth in his April 13, 2004 
offer applied only to that offer by stating: 
This offer is entirely dependent on my agreement with your 
attorney's terms.. . . I may, at my sole discretion, rescind or 
modify this offer. 
[R. at 10 & Ex. 1 to Plaintiffs' Addendum to Brief of Appellant (emphasis added)]. As 
set forth below, Plaintiff responded to Mr. Weigner's April 13, 2004 offer by making a 
counter-offer, which was accepted by Mr. Weigner. [See R. at 8-10]. At the very most, 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Weigner intended the escape 
clause to apply to his April 15, 2004 acceptance of 1800Contacts' April 15, 2004 
counter-offer. [Id.]. 
There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the parties' intent to enter a formal 
written agreement allowed either party to rescind the agreement reached on April 15, 
2004. On the contrary, Mr. Weigner, by going out of his way to expressly reserve his 
right to rescind his April 13, 2004 offer, suggests that Mr. Weigner did not believe that 
the parties' intent to enter a later formal written agreement was sufficient to allow 
Defendants to rescind the agreement prior to that time. [Id.]. 
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H. PLAINTIFF DID NOT ACCEPT MR. WEIGNER'S APRIL 13, 2004 
OFFER; RATHER, PLAINTIFF MADE A COUNTER-OFFER WHICH 
MR. WEIGNER ACCEPTED. 
The record shows that Mr. Weigner's April 13,2004 offer, which included 
Defendants' escape clause, was not accepted by 1800Contacts. [R. at 8-10]. At the very 
least, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding 1800Contacts' acceptance of that 
offer. [Id.]. 
In response to Mr. Weigner's April 13, 2004 offer, Mr. Coon stated in part: 
We accept your offer to sell and agree to purchase the assets 
of LensFast LLC including: contactlens.com, lensfast.com, 
the name LensFast, the customer database for any LensFast 
related companies, and any related internet domains or 
phone numbers associated with LensFast LLC. 
Standard with any transaction of this magnitude (and as we 
did with contactlenses.com), we will also expect a one year 
non-compete. Consideration will be included as part of the 
$800k purchase price. 
We will accept Campbell & Tannenwald as the escrow 
agent. 
Email back acceptance (just an email that says 'we are in 
agreement on this email') and we will get to work on a 
short definitive agreement. 
We either have an agreement or we don't. If we do, let's 
get it done. If we don't, let's not waste each other's time 
and resources playing tennis with a document. 
[R. at 9, Ex. 1 (emphasis added)]. 
It is evident from the express language of Mr. Coon's April 15, 2004 counter-offer 
that, despite stating that he "accepted" Mr. Weigner's April 13, 2004 offer, he was still in 
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doubt regarding whether an agreement existed and asked Mr. Weigner to accept his 
statement of the terms, including the additional term of a non-compete provision. [Id.]. 
It is well established that an "acceptance" of an offer that sets forth additional terms, is in 
reality a counter-offer. See, e.g., R. J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 821 
(Utah 1952) (holding that proposed written contract was a counter-offer rather than 
acceptance). 
Furthermore, Mr. Coon was clearly requesting that Mr. Weigner accept the terms 
set forth in Mr. Coon's April 15, 2004 counter-offer, which Mr. Weigner did in precisely 
the manner requested, prior to having counsel draft a formal written agreement in order to 
avoid wasting time and money. [R. at 8-9]. It makes sense that Mr. Coon would seek to 
confirm that there was a binding commitment to the material terms of the deal, which 
were set forth in the April 15, 2004 counter-offer and acceptance, prior to the preparation 
and execution of a complete written agreement. [Id.]. Mr. Coon's and 1800Contacts' 
subsequent efforts to draft a formal agreement are evidence that Plaintiff was satisfied 
that an agreement had been reached. [Id.]. 
III. THE FACTS SUPPORTING PLAINTIFF'S PRELIMINARY 
AGREEMENT ARGUMENT WERE NOT RAISED FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL; IN ANY EVENT, THE GENERAL RULE BARRING 
RAISING NEW ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL DOES NOT APPLY. 
Although Plaintiff did not specifically argue below that the parties had, at the very 
least, entered into a preliminary agreement, Plaintiff did set forth sufficient facts to 
support such a conclusion. [R. at 8-10; 69-71]. It has been Plaintiffs clear position at all 
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times that the parties had reached a binding agreement concerning the purchase of 
LensFast's assets prior to any attempts to prepare a written agreement. [Id.]. The lower 
court certainly could have (and should have) found that the parties, at the very least, had 
reached a preliminary agreement as to the material terms of the purchase agreement. 
Furthermore, given that this is an appeal of the lower court's granting of summary 
judgment, any failure on the part of Plaintiff in not raising the preliminary agreement 
legal theory does not prevent this Court from addressing the issue at the summary 
judgment stage of this litigation. See, e.g., Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 
406, 416 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that appellate court not required to only address legal 
grounds for lower court's decision on appeal of summary judgment decision). In 
granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment the trial court should have 
considered, under the evidence submitted, whether Plaintiff could prevail under any 
viable legal theory, whether specifically raised by the plaintiff or not. See, e.g., Astrada 
v. Howard, 979 F. Supp. 90, 95 (D. Conn. 1997) ("Ever mindful of its role at the 
summary judgment stage of litigation, the court will consider all possible claims."). 
Accordingly, the general rule requiring all issues to be raised below should not be applied 
in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons stated in the Brief of Appellant, this 
Court should reverse the lower Court's granting of summary judgment and remand the 
case for further proceedings. 
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